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Having a clear view of events that occurred over time is a difficult objective to achieve in
digital investigations (DI). Event reconstruction, which allows investigators to understand
the timeline of a crime, is one of the most important step of a DI process. This complex task
requires exploration of a large amount of events due to the pervasiveness of new tech-
nologies nowadays. Any evidence produced at the end of the investigative process must
also meet the requirements of the courts, such as reproducibility, verifiability, validation,
etc. For this purpose, we propose a new methodology, supported by theoretical concepts,
that can assist investigators through the whole process including the construction and the
interpretation of the events describing the case. The proposed approach is based on a
model which integrates knowledge of experts from the fields of digital forensics and
software development to allow a semantically rich representation of events related to the
incident. The main purpose of this model is to allow the analysis of these events in an
automatic and efficient way. This paper describes the approach and then focuses on the
main conceptual and formal aspects: a formal incident modelization and operators for
timeline reconstruction and analysis.
© 2014 Digital Forensics Research Workshop. Published by Elsevier Limited. All rights
reserved.
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Due to the rapid evolution of digital technologies and
their pervasiveness in everyday life, the digital forensics
field is facing challenges that were anecdotal a few years
ago. Existing digital forensics toolkits, such as EnCase or
FTK, simplify and facilitate the work during an investiga-
tion. However, the scope of these tools is limited to
collection and examination of evidence (i.e. studying its
properties), which are the first two steps of the investiga-
tion process, as defined in Palmer (2001). To extractoire Le2i, UMR CNRS
Bourgogne, BP47870,
abot).
hop. Published by Elsevier Lacceptable evidence, it is also necessary to deduce new
knowledge such as the causes of the current state of the
evidence (Carrier and Spafford, 2004b). The field of event
reconstruction aims at solving this issue: event recon-
struction can be seen as a process of taking as input a set of
events and outputting a timeline of the events describing
the case. Several approaches have been proposed to carry
out event reconstruction, which try to extract events and
then represent them in a single timeline (super-timeline
(Gudhjonsson, 2010)). This timeline allows to have a global
overview of the events occurring before, during and after a
given incident. However, due to the number of events
which can be very large, the produced timeline may be
quite complicated to analyse. This makes the interpretation
of the timeline and therefore the decision making very
difficult. In addition, event reconstruction is a compleximited. All rights reserved.
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dence rigorously collected, giving it full credibility.
In this paper, we first address these problems by pro-
posing an approach to reconstruct scenarios from suspect
data and analyse them using semantic tools and knowledge
from experts. Secondly, this paper answers the challenge of
correctness of the whole investigative process with a
formal incident modelization and timeline reconstruction
and analysis operators. The paper is organized as follows.
Section Related Works reviews important issues of the
events reconstruction problem and the various approaches
proposed so far. The SADFC (Semantic Analysis of Digital
Forensic Cases) approach is described in Section SADFC
approach, and the formal advanced timeline reconstruc-
tion and analysis model is presented in Section Advanced
timeline analysis model. Finally, a case study illustrating
the key characteristics of the proposed approach is given in
Section Case study.
Related works
Events reconstruction has many issues, which are
directly related to the size of the data, digital investigation
process complexity, and IT infrastructures challenges. For
instance, Table 1 compares some existing approaches (their
strengths (✓), limitations (✖), partial or inadequate solu-
tions (C)) with regard to some key issues, such as het-
erogeneity, automatic knowledge extraction, the use of
proven theory as support, analysis capabilities, and pres-
ervation of data integrity. While some of these challenges
have been a focus for many researchers and developers for
the last decade, the size of data volumes (Richard III &
Roussev, 2006) and data heterogeneity are still very chal-
lenging. The first (large data sizes) introduces many chal-
lenges at every phase of the investigation process; from the
data collection to the interpretation of the results. The
second (data heterogeneity) is usually due to multiple
footprint sources such as log files, information contained in
file systems, etc. We can classify events heterogeneity into
three categories:
 Format: The information encoding is not the same
among sources due to the formatting. Therefore,
depending on the source, footprint data may be
different.
 Temporal: The use of different sources from different
machines may cause timing problems. First, there are
some issues due to the use of different time zones and
unsynchronized clocks. Second, the temporalTable 1
Evaluation of approaches.
Approach/Criterion Auto extractio
ECF (Chen et al., 2003) ✓
FORE (Schatz et al., 2004b) ✓
Finite state machine(Gladyshev and Patel, 2004) ✖
Zeitline (Buchholz and Falk, 2005) C
Neural networks(Khan and Wakeman, 2006) C
CyberForensic TimeLab(Olsson and Boldt, 2009) ✓
log2timeline (Gudhjonsson, 2010) ✓
Timeline reconstruction (Hargreaves and Patterson, 2012) ✓heterogeneity can be due to the use of different formats
or granularities (e.g. 2 s in FAT file systems, 100 ns in
NTFS file systems).
 Semantic: The same event can be interpreted or repre-
sented in different ways. For example, an event
describing the visit of awebpagemay appear in different
ways in web browser logs and server logs.
In order to gather all the events found in footprint
sources in a single timeline, a good handling of all these
forms of heterogeneity is required. This leads to the
development of an automated information processing
approach which is able to extract knowledge from these
heterogeneous sources. In addition, once extracted, this
knowledge should be federated within the same model so
as to facilitate their interpretation and future analysis. The
effectiveness of a such approach can be assessed by the
following criteria:
 Efficient automated tools that can extract events and
build a timeline (Criterion 1 in Table 1).
 The ability to process multiple and various footprint
sources and to federate the information collected in a
coherent and structured way (Criterion 2 in Table 1).
 The ability to assist users during the timeline analysis.
This latter encompasses many aspects such as making
the timeline easier to read, identifying correlations be-
tween events or producing conclusions from knowledge
contained in the timeline (Criterion 3 in Table 1).
For the majority of existing approaches, solutions are
provided to automatically extract events and construct the
timeline. Chen et al. (2003) introduced a set of automated
extractors to collect events and store them in a canonical
database, which allows to quickly generate a temporal or-
dered sequence of events. These automatic extractors, a
widely used concept, can also generate the timeline (Olsson
and Boldt, 2009; Gudhjonsson, 2010; Hargreaves and
Patterson, 2012). However, current tools extract data in
its raw formwithout a good understanding of the meaning
of footprints, which makes their analysis more difficult. In
order to deal with the semantic heterogeneity, the FORE
(Forensics of Rich Events) system stores the events in an
ontology (Schatz et al., 2004a,b). This ontology uses the
notions of entity and event to represent the state change of
an object over time. Nevertheless, the time model imple-
mented in this ontology is not accurate enough (use of
instant rather than interval) to represent events accurately.
In addition, the semantic coverage of this ontology can ben Heterogeneity Analysis Theory Data integrity
✓ ✖ ✖ ✖
✓ C ✖ ✖
C C ✓ ✖
✓ ✖ ✖ ✓
C ✖ C ✖
✓ ✖ ✖ ✖
✓ ✖ ✖ ✖
✓ C C ✖
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Buchholz and Falk (2005). They proposed a scalable struc-
ture, a variant of a balanced binary search tree. However,
one of the problems of this approach is that one has to build
the case by manually selecting relevant events.
Some automatic events extraction approaches are also
able to process heterogeneous sources. This usually con-
sists of creating a set of extractors dedicated to each type of
footprint sources. In Gudhjonsson (2010), the authors
highlight several limitations of the current event recon-
struction systems such as the use of a small number of
event sources, which makes the timeline vulnerable to
anti-forensics techniques (e.g., alteration of timestamps).
They proposed to use a large number of event sources to
ensure that the high quality of the timeline and the impact
of anti-forensics techniques is minimized. log2timeline uses
various sources including Windows logs, history of various
web browsers, log files of other software resources, etc.
Multiple heterogeneous sources require a consistent rep-
resentation of the events in order to process them. The
majority of approaches propose their own model for event
representation. The most commonly used event features
include the date and time of the event (an instant or an
interval when the duration of events is included) and in-
formation about the nature of the event.
Regarding the timeline analysis, few solutions have
been proposed. The FORE approach attempts to identify
event correlations by connecting events with causal or ef-
fect links. In Gladyshev and Patel (2004), the authors try to
perform the event reconstruction by representing the sys-
tem behaviour as a finite state machine. The event recon-
struction process can be seen as a search for sequences of
transitions that satisfy the constraints imposed by the ev-
idence. Then, some scenarios are removed using the evi-
dence collected (thus, there is no automation of the
extraction process in this approach). In Hargreaves and
Patterson (2012), they proposed a pattern-based process
to produce high-level events (“human-understandable”
events) from a timeline containing low-level events (events
directly extracted from the sources). Although the pro-
posed approach is relevant, it can handle only one of the
many aspects of the analysis by helping the investigator to
read the timeline much easier. Therefore, other aspects
such as causality analysis between events are not covered
in this approach.
All approaches have to satisfy some key requirements
such as credibility, integrity, and reproducibility of the
digital evidence (Baryamureeba and Tushabe, 2004). In
recent years, the protagonists of digital forensics moved
away from investigative techniques that are based on the
investigators experience, to techniques based on proven
theories. It is also necessary to provide clear explanation
about the evidence found. In addition, one has to ensure
that the tools used do not modify the data collected on
crime scenes. Thus, it is necessary to develop tools that
extract evidence, while preserving the integrity of the data.
Finally, a formal and standard definition of the recon-
struction process is needed to ensure the reproducibility of
the investigation process and credibility of the results. A
clearly-defined investigation model allows to explain the
process used to get the results. To this end we believe thatthe following criteria are crucial for such techniques: the
use of a theoretical model to support the proposed
approach (criterion 4 in Table 1) and the ability to maintain
the data integrity (criterion 5 in Table 1). As a prelude to his
work, Gladyshev (Gladyshev and Patel, 2004) argued that a
formalization of the event reconstruction problem is
needed to simplify the automation of the process and to
ensure the completeness of the reconstruction. In Khan and
Wakeman (2006), the authors proposed an event recon-
struction system based on neural networks. The use of a
machine learning technique appears to be a suitable solu-
tion because it is possible to know the assumptions and
reasoning used to obtain final results. However, neural
networks behaviour is not entirely clear (especially during
the training step). Thus, the approach adopted by Khan
does not seem to fulfil the goal of making reasoning
explicit. In Hargreaves and Patterson (2012), the system
keeps information about the analysis which leads to infer
each high-level event. This gives the opportunity to provide
further information when needed. As for the preservation
of the data integrity, the approach described in Buchholz
and Falk (2005) uses a set of restrictions to prevent the
alteration of the evidence. Regarding the process model,
numerous investigation models have been proposed,
however, none of them is designed for automated or semi-
automated investigation. Existing models (DFWRS model
(Palmer, 2001), End to End Digital Investigation
(Stephenson, 2003), Event-Based Digital Forensics Investi-
gation Framework (Carrier and Spafford, 2004a), Enhanced
Digital Investigation Process Model (Baryamureeba and
Tushabe, 2004), Extended Model of Cybecrime Investiga-
tion (Ciardhuain, 2004), Framework for a Digital Forensics
Investigation (Kohn et al., 2006)) are designed to guide
humans investigators by providing a list of tasks to
perform. Thus, the proposed models are not accurate
enough to provide a framework for the development of
automated investigation tools. Among the limitations of
the existing frameworks, the characterization of the data
flow through the model is absent and the meaning of the
steps is not clear. The creation of awell-defined and explicit
framework is needed to allow an easy translation of the
investigation process into algorithms.
We can see in Table 1 that existing approaches are not
able to fulfil all the criteria. Two limitations of the existing
approaches are the lack of automation of the timeline
analysis and the absence of theoretical foundations to
explain the conclusions produced by the tools. The assis-
tance provided to the user should not be limited only to the
construction of the timeline. It is necessary to deal with a
large amount of events (criterion 3), the heterogeneity of
event sources, the need to federate events in a suitable
model (see criterion 1 and criterion 2), data integrity, and
the whole investigative process correctness and validation.
The purpose of this study is to propose an approach that
satisfies all the criteria presented in Table 1 while produc-
ing all the necessary evidence in an efficient way.
SADFC approach
To reach these objectives, we propose the following
approach:
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and the knowledge related to the investigation process
used to determine the circumstances of the incident:
- Introduce a formalization of the event reconstruction
problem by formally defining entities involved in an
incident.
- Define a knowledge representation model based on
the previous definitions used to store knowledge
about an incident and knowledge used to solve the
case (to give credibility to the results and to ensure
the reproducibility of the process).
 Provide extraction methods of the knowledge contained
in heterogeneous sources to populate the knowledge
model.
 Provide tools to assist investigators in the analysis of the
knowledge extracted from the incident.
Unlike conventional approaches, the SADFC approach
uses techniques from knowledge management, semantic
web and data mining at various phases of the investigation
process. Issues related to knowledge management and
ontology are two central elements of this approach as they
deal with a large part of the mentioned challenges. Ac-
cording to Gruber (1993), “an ontology is an explicit, formal
specification of a shared conceptualization”. Thus, ontology
allows to represent knowledge generated during an
investigation (knowledge about footprints, events, objects
etc.). Ontology provides several advantages such as the
possibility to use automatic processes to reason on
knowledge thanks to its formal and explicit nature, the
availability of rich semantics to represent knowledge
(richer than databases due to its sophisticated semantic
concepts (Martinez-Cruz et al., 2012)) and the possibility of
building a common vision of a topic that can be shared by
investigators and software developers. Ontology has
already proved its relevance in computer forensics (Schatz
et al., 2004a,b). The use of ontology is also motivated by its
successful use in other fields such as biology (Schulze-
Kremer, 1998) and life-cycle management (Vanlande
et al., 2008).
SADFC is a synergy of the three elements presented
below, which, once assembled, constitute a coherent
package describing methods, processes and technological
solutions needed for events reconstruction:
 Knowledge Model for Advanced Digital Forensics Timeline
Analysis which is presented in the following part of the
paper.
 Investigation Process Model: The aim of this model is to
define the various phases of the event reconstruction
process: their types, the order between them and the
data flow through the whole process.
 Ontology-centred architecture: This architecture consists
of several modules which implement some of the key
functions such as footprint extraction, knowledge
management, ontology and the visualization of the final
timeline. This architecture is based on an ontology
which implements the knowledge model proposed in
our approach. As the proposed ontologies in Schatz et al.
(2004a,b) are not advanced enough, we have designed
and developed a new ontology. For instance, somerelations included in our knowledgemodel are absent in
the ontology of the FORE system.
In the following sections, we present a formalized
knowledge model for advanced forensics timeline analysis,
while the investigation process model and the architecture
will be discussed in details in other documents.
Advanced timeline analysis model
This section describes the knowledge model used in the
SADFC approach to allow to perform an in-depth analysis of
timeline while fulfilling the law requirements. Models
proposed in the literature (Schatz et al., 2004a,b) are still
limited in terms of the amount of knowledge they can store
about events and therefore, analysis capabilities. Temporal
characteristics predominate over other aspects such as
interaction of events with objects, processes or people.
Knowledge representing the relations between events and
others entities is not sufficiently diversified for the subse-
quent analysis required. Thus, we propose a rich knowledge
representation containing a large set of entities and re-
lations and allowing to build automated analysis processes.
In addition, the proposed model is designed to meet the
legal requirements and contains knowledge allowing to
reproduce the investigative process and to give full credi-
bility to the results. It should be noted that the assumption
that the data has been processed upstream to ensure ac-
curacy and correctness is used. A digital forensic investi-
gation process model including processes for consistency
check of data and filtering will be proposed in future works.
We will first formally define the entities and relations
composing themodel and then, introduce a set of operators
to manipulate the knowledge. An overview of the proposed
knowledge model is given in Fig. 1.Formal modelling of incident
We first define entities of our knowledge model and
then we detail the four composed relations using this
knowledge.
Subject, object, event and footprint
A crime scene is a space where a set of events
E ¼ {e1,e2,…,ei} takes place. An event is a single action
occurring at a given time and lasting a certain duration. An
event may be the drafting of a document, the reading of a
webpage or a conversation via instant messaging software.
Subject. During its life cycle, an event involves subjects. Let S
be the set containing subjects covering human actors and
processes (e.g. Firefox web browser, Windows operating
system, etc.), a subject x2S corresponds to an entity
involved in one or more events e2E and is defined by
x ¼ {a2Asjxas a} where:
 As is a set containing all the attributes which can be used
to describe a subject. A subject attribute may be the first
name and the last name of a person, the identifier of a
web session, the name of a Windows session, etc.
Fig. 1. Knowledge model.
Table 2
Allen algebra.
Y. Chabot et al. / Digital Investigation 11 (2014) S95eS105 S99 as is the relation used to link a subject with the attri-
butes of As describing it.
Object. During its life cycle, an event can also interact with
objects. An object may be a webpage, a file or a registry key
for example. An object x2O is defined by x¼ {a2Ao j xao a}
where:
 Ao is a set containing all the attributes which can be used
to describe an object. An object attribute may be for
example a filename, the location of an object on a hard
disk, etc.
 ao is the relation used to link an object with the attri-
butes of Ao describing it.
 O4§ðAoÞ is the set of the objects, meaning that o2O
belongs to the power set of Ao. An object is a composi-
tion of one or several attributes of Ao.
Note, that for easier human understanding, an object can
also be seen as a composition of attributes and objects
(becauseobjects are sets of attributes), e.g. a registrykey is an
object composedof several attributes such as its value and its
key name. This registry key is also an attribute of the object
representing the database containing all keys of the system.
Event. Each event takes place in a time-interval defined by
a start time and an end time. These boundaries define the
life cycle of the event. The use of a time interval allows to
represent the notion of uncertainty (Liebig et al., 1999). For
example, when the start time of an event cannot be
determined accurately, the use of a time-interval allows to
approximate it. The use of intervals requires the introduc-
tion of a specific algebra (e.g. to order events). In our work,
the Allen algebra, illustrated in the Table 2, is used (Allen,
1983). The authors of this paper are aware of the prob-
lems caused by temporal heterogeneity and anti-forensics
techniques on the quality and the accuracy of timestamps
(granularity, timestamps offset and alteration, timezone,
etc). Several works try to characterize the phenomena
related to the use of time information in digital forensic
investigations and to propose techniques to solve these
problems (Schatz et al., 2006; Gladyshev and Patel, 2005;
Forte, 2004). In this paper, we assume that all timestamps
used in our model are adjusted and normalized beforehand
by a process that will be the subject of future work (the
proposed model is generic enough to incorporate future
solutions). We consider that each function returns the
value 1 if events meet the constraints and 0 otherwise.An event e2E is defined by e ¼ {tstart,tend,l,Se,Oe,Ee}
where:
 tstart is the start time of the event, tend is the end-time of
the event and l is the location where the event took
place. This location may be a machine (represented by
an IP) and its geolocalisation.
 Se is a set containing all subjects involved in the event.
Se ¼ {s2S j e2E, s ss e} where ss is a composed relation
used to link an event e2E with a subject s2S. The
relation ss is defined below.
 Oe is a set containing all objects related to the event e.
Oe ¼ {o2O j e2E, eso o} where so is a composed relation
used to link an event e2E with an object o2O. The
relation so is defined below.
 Ee is the set containing all events with which the event is
correlated. Ee ¼ {x2E j e2E, ese x} where se is a
composed relation used to link an event e2E with an
event x2E. The relation se is defined below.
Footprint. According to Ribaux (2013), a footprint is the sign
of a past activity and a piece of information allowing to
reconstruct past events. A footprint may be a log entry or a
web history for example as a log entry gives information
about software activities and web histories provide infor-
mation about user's behaviour on the Web. Let F be a set
containing all footprints related to a case, a footprint x2F is
defined by x ¼ {a2Af j xaf a} where:
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to describe a footprint. For example, a bookmark con-
tains attributes such as the title of the bookmark, the
date of creation and the webpage pointed by the
bookmark.
 af is the relation used to link a footprint with the attri-
butes of Af used to described it.
Footprints are the only available information to define
past events and can be used by investigators to reconstruct
the events which happened during an incident. However,
the imperfect and incomplete nature of the footprints can
lead to produce approximate results. It is therefore not al-
ways possible to determine which event is associated with
a given footprint. In addition, it is not always possible to
fully reconstruct an event from a footprint. Thus, a footprint
can be used to identify one or several features:
 The temporal features of an event. For example, a foot-
print extracted from the table moz_formhistory (data-
base FormHistoryof thewebbrowser Firefox) canbeused
to establish the time at which a form field has been filled.
 A relation between an event and an object. For example,
a footprint extracted from the table moz_historyvisits
(database Places of the web browser Firefox) can be
used to link an event representing the visit of a webpage
to this webpage.
 A relation between an event and a subject. For example,
all footprints produced by the web browser Firefox are
stored in a folder named with the profile name of the
user. This allows to link each Firefox event to the user
designated by this name.
 The features of an object. For example, a footprint
extracted fromthe tablemoz_places (databasePlaces) can
be used to determine the URL and the title of a webpage.
 The features of a subject. For example, a footprint extrac-
ted fromthe tablemoz_historyvisits (database Places) can
be used to determine the session identifier of a user.
Relations
To link the entities presented before, four composed
relations which were introduced in previous part are
detailed here.
Subjects relations. ss is composed of two types of relations
to link an event e2Ewith a subject s2S and can be defined
in the following way ss ¼ s isInvolved e∨s undergoes e:
 Relation of participation: s isInvolved e means that s
initiated or was involved in e. For example, the user of a
computer is involved in an event representing the login
to the session, etc.
 Relation of repercussion: s undergoes e means that s is
affected by the execution of e. For example, a user is
affected by the removal of one of his files, etc.
Objects relations. so is composed of four types of relations to
link an event e2E with an object o2O and can be defined
in the following way so¼ e creates o∨e removes o∨emodifies
o∨e uses o: Relation of creation: e creates o means that o does not
exist before the execution of e and that o is created by e.
 Relation of suppression: e removes o means that o does
not exist anymore after the execution of e and that o is
deleted by e.
 Relation of modification: emodifies o means that one or
more attributes of o are modified during the execution
of e.
 Relation of usage: e uses o means that one or more at-
tributes of o are used by e to carry out its task.
Events relations. se is composed of relations used to link two
events x,e2E and can be defined in the following way
se ¼ x composes e∨e composes x∨x causes e∨e causes x. In our
works, x is Correlated e means that x is linked to e on the
basis of multiple criteria: use of common resources,
participation of a common person or process, temporal
position of events. We distinguish two special cases of the
relation of correlation:
 Relation of composition: x composes e means that x is an
event composing e. For example, an event representing
aWindows session is composed of all events initiated by
the user during this session. Let x ¼ {txstart,txend,Sx,Ox,Ex}
be an event composing e ¼ {testart,teend,Se,Oe,Ee}, the
relation of composition implies a set of constraints. First,
a temporal constraint requiring that sub-events take
place during the parent event. Using Allen relations, if
x composes e then equal(x,e) or during(x,e) or starts(x,e)
or finishes(x,e). Sub-events have also constraints on
participating subjects as well as the objects with which
the event interacts. If x composes e then Sx4Se and
Ox4Oe. Thus, x composes e ¼ [equal(x,e)∨during(x,e)
∨starts(x,e)∨finishes(x,e)]∧(Sx4Se)∧(Ox4Oe).
 Relation of causality: x causes e means that x has to
happen to allow e to happen. For example, an event
describing the download of a file from a server is caused
by the event describing the connection to this server. An
event can have several causes and can be the cause of
several events. Let e ¼ {testart,teend,Se,Oe,Ee} be an event
caused by x ¼ {txstart,txend,Sx,Ox,Ex}, the relation of cau-
sality implies a temporal constraint requiring that the
cause must happen before the consequence. Using Allen
algebra, x causes e ¼ [before(x,e)∨meets(x,e)∨overlaps
(x,e)∨starts(x,e)]∨(Sx∩Se)∨(Ox∩Oe).
Footprints relation. sf is a relation used to link a footprint
f2F with an entity en2{EOS}. This relation is called
Relation of support: f supports en means that f is used to
deduce one or more attributes of en. We define a function
support which can be used to know the footprints
used to deduce a given entity: support(en2
{EOS}) ¼ {f2F j f sf en}. For example, an entry of a web
history can be used to reconstruct an event representing
the visit of a webpage by a user.
Crime scene
In our works, we define a crime scene CS as an envi-
ronment in which an incident takes place and by
CS ¼ {PCS,DCS}. PCS is a set containing the physical crime
Y. Chabot et al. / Digital Investigation 11 (2014) S95eS105 S101scenes. At the beginning of an investigation, PCS is initial-
ized with the localization where the incident takes place.
However, in an investigation, the crime scene is not limited
to only one building. Due to network communication for
example, the initial physical crime scene may be extended
to a set of new physical crime scenes if one of the pro-
tagonists communicated with an other person through the
network, downloaded a file from a remote server, etc. In
these cases, the seizure of the remote machines (and by
extension, the creation of new physical crime scenes and
digital crime scenes) should be taken into account as it may
be relevant for the investigation. DCS is a set containing the
digital crime scenes. Unlike Carrier (Carrier and Spafford,
2003), there is no distinction between primary and sec-
ondary digital crime scene in our works to simplify the
modelization.
A crime scene is also related to events that take place on
it ECS ¼ {EiCS∪EcCS∪EnCS}. For easier notation, we write here
E ¼ {Ei∪Ec∪En} where:
 Ei is a set containing illicit events as Ei ¼ {e2E j esi i,i2I}
with I a set containing all actions considered as in-
fractions by the laws and si the relation linking an event
with an action. For example, an event representing the
upload of defamatory documents to a website is an
event of Ei.
 Ec is a set containing the correlated events as
Ec ¼ {e2E j e si l,l2L,ese x,x2Ei}. This set contains all
legal events which are linkedwith a set of illicit events x.
 En ¼ {En(Ei∪Ec)} is a set containing the events which are
not relevant for the investigation.Event reconstruction and analysis operators
Since investigators have ensure the preservation of the
crime scene, it becomes a protected static environment
containing a set of footprints. After the collection of all the
footprints of the crime scene, the goal of the event
reconstruction consists in moving from the static crime
scene to a timeline describing the dynamics of an incident
which happened in the past. Describing an incident means
identify all the events Einc ¼ Ei∪Ec using footprints of F.
Events ordered chronologically describing an incident are
called the scenario of the incident. In the SADFC approach,
four operators are defined to carry out the event recon-
struction. These operators are illustrated in the Section
Case study.
The aim of extraction operators is to identify and extract
relevant information contained in digital footprints from
various sources. Sources are chosen according to the
definition of the perimeter of the crime scene. The rele-
vancy or the irrelevancy of information contained in
footprints is determined by the investigators according to
the goals of the investigation. For example, in a case
involving illegal downloads of files, the investigator will
pay more attention to information related to the user
behaviour on the web while logs of word processing
software will be ignored. The mapping operators create
entities (events, objects and subjects) associated to the
extracted footprints. These operators take the form ofmapping rules allowing to connect attributes extracted
from footprints and attributes of events, objects and sub-
jects. A large part of the features of an event can be
determined by extraction operators from footprints
collected in the crime scene. However, the identification of
some kinds of features requires the use of advanced
techniques such as inference. The inference operators allow
to deduce new knowledge about entities from existing
knowledge. Unlike extraction operators which use
knowledge of footprints, inference operators use the
knowledge about events, objects and subjects (knowledge
generated by mapping operators). The analysis operators
are used to help the investigators during the interpretation
of the timeline. These operators can be used to identify
relations between events or to highlight the relevant in-
formation of the timeline. In our works, we introduce an
operator dedicated to the identification of event correla-
tions. The correlation between two events e,x2E is
measured by the following function:
Correlationðe;xÞ¼CorrelationTðe;xÞþCorrelationSðe;xÞ
þCorrelationOðe;xÞþCorrelationKBRðe;xÞ
(1)
Correlation(e,x) can be weighted to allow to give more
importance to one of the correlation functions. Correlatio-
n(e,x) can also be ordered and thresholded to deal with data
volume constraints by selecting the most significant cor-
relations. Those four correlations are described in the
following way:
Temporal Correlation, CorrelationT(e,x). First of all, a set of
assumptions about the temporal aspect is defined (ac-
cording to the Allen algebra given in Table 2):
 The greater the relative difference between the two
events before(e,x) is, the lower the temporal relatedness
is and reciprocally.
 The temporal relatedness is high for functions meet-
s(e,x), overlaps(e,x), during(e,x) and finishes(e,x) and
maximal for starts(e,x) and equals(e,x).
Thus;CorrelationT ðe; xÞ ¼ a*startsðe; xÞ þ a*equalsðe; xÞ
þmeetsðe; xÞ þ overlapsðe; xÞ
þ duringðe; xÞ þ finishesðe; xÞ
þ beforeðe; xÞ
(2)
where starts(e,x), equals(e,x), meets(e,x), overlaps(e,x), dur-
ing(e,x), finishes(e,x) are binary functions and
before(e,x) ¼ 1/(xtstartetend). Previous assumptions state
that the more two events are close in time, the more it is
likely that these events are correlated. Because of time
granularities, and multi-tasks computers, if two events
start at the same time, the relatedness is more important.
That is why this importance can be highlighted with an a
factor.
Subject Correlation, CorrelationS(e,x) and Object Correla-
tion, CorrelationO(e,x). These two correlations respectively
quantify correlations regarding subjects involved in each
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events. The following hypothesis are defined according to
the core idea of several domains such as data mining, for
example in formal concept analysis (Ganter et al., 1997)
which groups objects regarding to the attributes they share
or in statistics such as principal component analysis, which
groups observations measuring how far they are spread
(variance).
 The relatedness between e and x increases proportion-
ally to the number of common subjects they share
regarding to relations of participation and repercussion.
CorrelationS(e,x) ¼ jSe∩Sxj /max(jSej,jSxj).
 The relatedness between e and x increases proportion-
ally to the number of objects they share regarding to
relations of creation, suppression,modification and usage.
CorrelationO(e,x) ¼ jOe∩Oxj /max(jOej,jOxj).
Rule-based Correlation, CorrelationKBR(e,x). In addition to
the previous factors (time, subject, object), rules based on
expert knowledge can be used to correlate events.
CorrelationKBRðe; xÞ ¼
Pn
r¼1rulerðe; xÞ with ruler(e,x) ¼ 1 if
the rule is satisfied and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the greater
the number of satisfied rules is, the greater the value of
CorrelationKBR is. All correlation functions return a score
between 0 and 1 except CorrelationKBR. This specificity al-
lows to give more importance to expert knowledge syn-
thesized in the rules.
Case study
The aim of this section is to illustrate with an example
how this knowledge model can be used to formalize a
computer forensics case and reconstruct the incident by
using the proposed operators. To illustrate the capabilities
of our model, we designed a fictitious investigation con-
cerning a company manager who contacted a private
investigator after suspicions about one of its employees.
The manager believes that this employee uses the internet
connection of the company to illegally download files for
personal purposes. As the investigation process model is
not presented yet, we used in this case study a process
designed for the need of this paper and composed of five
steps: the definition of the crime scene, the collection of
footprints, the creation of entities (event, object, subject),
the enrichment of the extracted knowledge and finally the
construction and the analysis of the timeline.Fig. 2. Overview of the knowledge generated during the case.Crime scene definition
As a start of the investigation, the investigator evaluates
the size of the crime scene. As suspicions concern the
workstation of the employee, the open-space of the com-
pany where this computer is located is designated as the
physical crime scene. Based on the testimony and to reduce
the complexity of the investigation, only the workstation of
the suspected employee is added to theDCS set. To establish
whether or not the doubts on the employee are founded, the
investigator in charge of the case seizes the machine usedby the employee and starts using the theoretical tools pro-
posed in this paper to track the user's past activities.
Footprints collection
After defining the machine used by the employee as
crime scene, the investigator collects footprints on this
latter. To carry out this step, the extraction operators are
used. According to the objectives of the investigation, the
investigator chooses to collect footprints left by the web
browser used by the employee as he knows that he can find
information about downloads performed by the user. The
output of the extraction is a set containing several types of
web browser footprints (id is a unique identifier for each
element populating our model):
 fWebpage(id,webpageID,pageTitle,URL,hostname): foot-
print giving information about a webpage.
 fVisit(id,date,session,pageID): footprint of a visit of a
webpage.
 fBookmark(id,date,bookmarkTitle,pageID): footprint of a
creation of a bookmark.
 fDownload(id,start,end,filename,pageSourceID,URLTarget):
footprint of a file download where start and end are the
dates on which the download starts and ends, page-
SourceID is the webpage from where the download is
launched and URLTarget is the destination used to store
the file.
The result of the extraction is given in Fig. 3 and is
illustrated in the left part of Fig. 2.
Entities creation
The output of this step is a set containing the entities
(event, object, subject) which can be recovered using the
Fig. 3. Output of footprints extraction.
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step, the mapping operators are used. The output of the
mapping is the set of entities given in Fig. 4 and illustrated in
the right part of Fig. 2. Entities are linked together by re-
lations defined in Section Relations. support(x,y) means that
the footprint identified by the id x has been used to create
the entity identify by the id y. participation(x,y) means that
the subject x is involved in the event y.usage(x,y)means that
the event x used the object y. A subject is defined by sub-
ject(id,session)where id is a unique identifierwhile session is
the session number associated to the user. The hypothesis
that duration of bookmark creation and the visit of a web-
page is null is used (start time equals to end time).
Knowledge enrichment
This step is particularly useful to improve the results of
the analysis steps as it allows to discover new knowledge
about entities. For example, the only available information
todetermine the subject involved in an event generatedbya
web browser is the session identifier found in some digital
footprints extracted from Web browser. To identify theFig. 4. Entities created by tsubject involved in other events, we used an inference
operator based on the following assumption. Let ei be the
first visit of awebpage for the session s, ej the last visit of s, ti
the start date of ei and tj the enddate of ej, an event occurring
on themachine in a datewithin the time interval defined by
ti and tj involves the person who owns the session s. In this
case study, the person who is involved in the event even-
tid¼19 (j) in Fig. 4 (creation of a bookmark for the webpage
“http://www.warez.com”) is unknown. However, using the
previous inference rule, it is possible to infer that the user is
the subject subjectid¼13 (d) using the fact that this user
perform a visit of a webpage before and after the event
eventid¼19 (j) (respectively eventid¼15 (f) and eventid¼16 (g)).
Thus, the fact participation(13,19) can be added.
Timeline construction and analysis
After collecting knowledge about events and related
entities, the last step is to build the associated timeline and
analyse it. A graphical representation of the timeline is
given in Fig. 5. To find correlations between events, the
operator introduce in Section Event reconstruction andhe mapping process.
Fig. 5. Timeline of the incident.
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correlations, three events defined in Fig. 4 are used. In this
example, the correlations between the events eventid¼15 (f)
and eventid¼17 (h) (called “pair A”) and between the events
eventid¼15 (f) and eventid¼19 (j) (called “pair B”) are
computed. First, the subject correlation and the object
correlation are computed. Regarding the pair A, the two
events share neither subjects nor objects. Regarding the
pair B, the two events use a common resource which is the
webpage “http://www.warez.com” (objectid¼11 (b)). A
common subject is also involved in both events: the subject
identified by the session number 14 (subjectid¼13 (d)). Sec-
ond, the temporal correlation is computed. For both pairs,
the case before(x,e) where an event occurs before the other
is used. Thus, the temporal correlation is greater for the pair
B than the pair A as the relative difference between even-
tid¼15 (f) and eventid¼19 (j) is lower than the difference be-
tween eventid¼15 (f) and eventid¼17 (h). To conclude, the pair
B is more correlated than the pair A due to the use of a
common object (objectid¼11 (b)), the participation of a
common subject (subjectid¼13 (d)) and the temporal prox-
imity between these two events. At the end of the analysis
step, the investigator gets a timeline enriched with infor-
mation about correlations between events. The investigator
starts the interpretation of the results by identifying
eventid¼15 (f) which is a visit of the website “warez.com”
that appears to be a web platform providing links to illegal
files. Then, correlation results show that eventid¼15 (f) and
eventid¼19 (j) are highly correlated. This correlation allows
to conclude that the visit of the website is voluntary and
that this website has some relevance for the user (indeed,
he uses a bookmark to facilitate a subsequent visit). The
analysis of others events and others possible correlations
can lead to the conclusion than the user has visited inten-
tionally the website “warez.com” and used this website to
download illegal files.Conclusion and future works
In digital investigations, one of the most important
challenge is the reconstruction and the analysis of past
events, because of the heterogeneity of data and the vol-
ume of data to process. To answer this challenge we pre-
sent the SADFC approach. It allows to reduce the tedious
character of the analysis thanks to automatic analysis
processes helpful for the investigators. Thus, investigatorscan focus on the tasks for which their expertise and
experience are most needed such as interpretation of re-
sults, validation of hypotheses, etc. Moreover, SADFC im-
plements mechanisms allowing to satisfy law
requirements. These mechanisms rely on formal defini-
tions on which this paper focuses: a formalization of the
event reconstruction containing formal definitions of en-
tities involved in an incident and four sets of operators
allowing to extract, manipulate and analyse the knowledge
contained in the model. The case study presented in the
previous section has shown the relevance of this model.
Indeed, the use of a semantically rich representation using
new semantic aspects (in addition to temporal aspects)
allows to build advanced analysis processes. In particular,
we have presented the possibilities introduced by our
model to correlate events. The identification of correlated
events enables to highlight valuable information for the
investigators.
Future works will be to develop the two other com-
ponents of our approach. First, we will design an investi-
gation process model providing a framework for the
development of automated investigation tools. This pro-
cess model will include a definition of the steps composing
a digital investigation, from the preservation of the crime
scene to the presentation of conclusions to Justice passing
through the definition of the crime scene, the collection of
footprints, the construction and the analysis of the time-
line. During the development of this model, the focus is on
the precision and completeness of the definition of each
step as well as its inputs and outputs. Second, we will
implement the theoretical model presented in this paper.
This implementation will consist of a reference architec-
ture based on an ontology derived from our knowledge
model coupled with inference mechanisms and analysis
algorithms. This architecture will be used to validate our
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